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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
WITNESSES--COMPETENCY-WHETHER THE STATUTE PROHIBITING AN
ADVERSE PARTY FROM TESTIFYING TO ADMISSIONS BY A DECEASED JOINT
CONTRACTOR UNLESS THE SURVIVING JOINT CONTRACTOR WAS ALSO PRESENT
APPLIES TO A SURVIVING JOINT TENAN---The Supreme Court of Illinois, in
the recent case of Anderson v. Lybeck,' construed, for the first time, that
portion of the "dead man's statute" 2 which is concerned with the admis-
sions of a deceased joint contractor. Certain realty had been conveyed by a
father to his son under circumstances creating a constructive trust. After
the father's death, the son repeatedly acknowledged the interest therein
of the father's other heirs. However, the son's death seven years later
revealed that he had reconveyed the property to himself and his wife
in joint tenancy. At this juncture, one of the father's heirs brought suit
against the surviving joint tenant seeking to impose a constructive trust
on the realty. The defendant relied on the statute of limitations 3 and,
in response thereto, the plaintiff offered to prove by her own testimony the
aforementioned acknowledgments which had been made within the limita-
tion period. The defendant objected to the testimony on the ground that
it was inadmissible because of the statutory prohibition regarding the ad-
missions of a deceased joint contractor. The circuit court sustained the
objection and dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by the
statute of limitations. On a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, 4
the lower court's decision was reversed and remanded. The high court
held that a joint tenant can be distinguished from a joint contractor and,
therefore, such testimony was not within the scope of the statutory pro-
hibition.
Under the common law all witnesses with an interest in the outcome
of the litigation were disqualified, because of the fear that interested
persons would resort to calculated mendacity to further their own causes.
Presently, because of enabling statutes passed almost a century ago, inter-
ested persons are, in general, deemed to be competent witnesses. 5 These
statutes were probably motivated by the realization that in most litigation
interested persons are more apt to be cognizant of the pertinent facts than
115 Ill. (2d) 227,154 N. E. (2d) 259 (1958).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 4, prohibits a person adversely interested
from testifying to admissions or conversations by any deceased partner or joint con-
tractor unless one or more of the surviving partners or joint contractors were also
present.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 16, provides for a five year limitation on
actions stemming from oral contracts.
4 Direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was made by the authority of Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 75, which provides for such procedure where a
freehold is Involved.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 1, generally permits all persons to give
testimony.
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are uninterested third parties, and that modern procedures for cross-exami-
nation, impeachment and contradiction afford a feasible means for deter-
mining the credibility of witnesses. The "dead man's statute," 6 a relic
of the aforementioned common law rule, remains as an exception to the
general enabling statutes. Its purpose and intent is to put the parties on
an equal footing,7 since the dead man cannot contradict or explain the
testimony of the adversely interested witness.
That portion of the "dead man's statute" on which the defendant
relied in the instant case is actually a protraction of the main body of the
"dead man's statute" in that it is applicable even though the estate of
the deceased is not a party to the suit. The intention of the legislation
is to protect the surviving interested party from the possibility of fraudu-
lent allegations regarding the admissions and conversations of the deceased
when there is no means of contradicting or explaining such allegations.8
The sole appellate court construction of the term "joint contractor,"
since the enactment of the "dead man's statute" in 1867, occurred in
1880 in the case of Henry v. Tiffany9 in which the court held that this
phraseology encompasses not only parties jointly obligated by a simple con-
tract but also includes the parties jointly obligated by the accessory con-
tract in a suretyship transaction. However, the dead party to the surety-
ship contract involved in the case of People v. Borders ° was not treated
so kindly. Therein, the court admitted the testimony of the plaintiff
creditor regarding the fraudulent manner in which the deceased principal
debtor had obtained a receipt which purported to release the principal.
It was there held that the testimony in question was concerned with a
transaction of the deceased rather than an admission or conversation and,
therefore, was not within the limitation of the statute. There appears to
be a basic inconsistency in these two cases in that the living joint con-
tractor's interest is as vulnerable to fraudulent testimony regarding trans-
actions of the deceased as it is to fraudulent testimony regarding the
verbal admissions and conversation of the deceased.
With this sparse and uncertain background the court was faced with
the contention that the joint tenancy arose by contract and, therefore,
the joint tenants were joint contractors and the surviving joint tenant was
6 il. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 2, provides that no party to a civil action
shall be permitted to testify therein on his motion or in his own behalf, when any
adverse party sues or defends as heir or devisee.
7 Nordman v. Carlson, 291 i. 438, 10 N. E. (2d) 53 (1937) ; Vancuren v. Vancuren,
348 Ill. App. 351, 109 N. E. (2d) 225 (1953).
s Foster v. Hart, 29 Ill. App. 260 (1890).
9 5 111. App. 548 (1880).
10 31 Ill. App. 426 (1889).
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entitled to the protection afforded by the statute. The court, however,
distinguished a joint tenant from a joint contractor on the ground that
a joint tenant has no duty to maintain the joint tenancy and, therefore,
ruled that the testimony regarding the admissions of the deceased joint
tenant was competent. This ruling seemingly ignores the underlying policy
of the statute because the absence of a duty on a joint tenant to maintain
the joint tenancy has no apparent bearing on the necessity of protecting
the surviving interested party from fraudulent testimony as to the admis-
sions of the deceased.
The decision also emphasizes some incongruous results caused by the
"dead man's statute." For example, if the deceased in the instant case
had not deeded the property in question, the crucial testimony probably
would not have been admitted because the defendant would then have
been in the position of an heir or a devisee of the decedent. A case in
point is Lotta v. Lotta," one wherein the plaintiffs' mother acquired prop-
erty under circumstances sufficient to create a resulting trust. The mother
then deeded the property to her husband and later regained title by devise
from him. In the plaintiffs' suit to impose a trust, their testimony was
denied admission for the reason that the mother was defending as a
devisee. 12 The apparent inconsistencies in the two cases are compounded
by the fact that, in the first case, the statute was not applied although
the parties would thereby be placed on an unequal footing because the
deceased party would have been the only one capable of explaining or
contradicting the plaintiffs' testimony. However, in the Lotta case the
statute was applied even though a failure to do so would not have placed
the parties on an unequal footing since the deceased party had no connec-
tion with the facts alleged in seeking to establish the trust while the
mother, a party to the questioned transactions and a defendant in the case,
was in a position to explain or contradict the plaintiffs' testimony.
Notwithstanding these ostensibly incongruous holdings, the court's
decision not to apply the statute in the instant case was a good one in that
it opened the door to testimony intended to prevent fraud whereas a
decision to apply the statute, as in the Lotta case, would have allowed
the defendant to reap the benefits of fraud. The paradox resulting where
the application of a statute whose basic policy is the prevention of fraud
fails to prevent it and where a failure to apply the statute does prevent
fraud delineates a basic fault, namely, that while the statute shields the
116 I1. (2d) 397, 129 N. E. (2d) 153 (1955), noted in 35 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
Rvivw 39.
12 Ibid. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 2, makes a party directly Interested
incompetent to testify in his own behalf or on his own motion in a civil suit against
a devisee.
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interests of the dead, it does so by removing a means of protection other-
wise available to the living. This fault could be overcome either by the
complete repeal of the "dead man's statute" or by amending it to allow
its application at the discretion of the court.13
P. A. WEISS
is See Vol. 2, Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 422 and 578 (3rd ed. 1940), wherein the
"dead man's statutes" in effect in various states are quoted and the two suggested
corrective measures are discussed.
